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No-Fault: A Perspective 
Leon Green* 
At the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, 
December 27, 1974, the Torts Section sponsored a panel discussion of 
Professor Jeffrey O'Connell's proposal that no-fault insurance be ex- 
panded beyond the field of automobile accidents. The proposal, as pre- 
sented in O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: 
Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. REV. 749 (1973), advocates "enterprise lia- 
bility" for any entity or person that systematically creates risks of personal 
injury. I t  would be "no-fault" liability, blind to the fault of either party, 
and paid by the enterprise's insurer or by the enterprise as a self-insurer. 
Payments would be limited to out-of-pocket losses not compensated from 
collateral sources, and no recovery would be allowed for pain and suffer- 
ing. The plaintiff would have the option of asserting his claim either 
under regular tort liability or under enterprise liability, unless the de- 
fendant elects in advance to be covered exclusively by enterprise liability. 
Enterprise liability would not apply to injuries intentionally caused by 
the enterprise or intentionally inflicted by the victim upon himself. 
The following is Professor Green's response to the O'Connell proposal. 
These remarks were delivered in acknowledgement of the William Lloyd 
Prosser Award "for outstanding contribution to the development of the 
law of torts" presented to Professor Green at the meeting. Editors. 
In discussions with philosophers, economists, and other abstract artists, 
I am always ill at ease if not terrified. Their broad assumptions and 
sweeping conclusions leave a mere lawyer, with his meager history and 
earthy arguments, little chance of survival. Please do not misunderstand 
me. I am aware that philosophies, economic theories, and scientific pro- 
jections had their beginnings in hunches, bubble blowing, daydreams, 
and inspirations at first simple and definite, but I am also aware that they 
later became expanded to abstractions incomprehensible other than by 
the elite. I do not question the validity of any of them. Instead, I recog- 
nize in them the unlimited creative power of human beings. Nor does it 
bother me that most of their creations have flourished for a season and 
then collapsed or have had to wait until a later day for their acceptance. 
For example, it does not destroy my faith in economists that today they 
are bewildered by the coexistence of inflation and depression. I am sure 
that after we have weathered this illegitimate crisis they will regroup-and 
explain to those who come after us how such phenomena could appear 
simultaneously and how successfully they were dealt with on sound 
economic principles. 
When I first read Professor O'Connell's article, "Expanding No-Fault 
*Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Texas. 
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Beyond Auto Insurance,"l I marked it as a worthy inspiration of an able 
daydreamer. Successive readings have deeply engraved that impression. 
Under the seductive title "No-Fault," he has created a structure for the 
care of those who fall victim to the hazards of enterprise that would leave 
it free to give us more and better goods and services without subjection 
to the delays, expense, and encumbrances of courts and lawyers. It could 
prove as exciting as the bubble-blown creation that made it possible a few 
days ago to look in on Jupiter with a promised visit to one of Saturn's 
moons some 5 years hence. Or it could prove as practical as the inspira- 
tion that gave us the blessings of Geritol. But whatever it may do will be 
of great concern to those who spend their days with torts. 
If our people continue to maintain a free society, my perspective is that 
No-Fault will be woven into the texture of tort law in a manner that will 
not conflict with our goals of peace, happiness, health, justice, economic 
welfare, law and order here on earth and in heaven hereafter. But it is 
entirely possible that No-Fault will have considerable influence on our 
more practiced and negative virtues of war, power, greed, deceit, waste, 
riotous living, sex, hate, and death. This does not mean there will be 
breeds of full-fledged saints and dedicated sinners at one another's throats, 
but that everyone will take turns as saint and sinner at many points in 
time. Creation and destruction will continue to go hand in hand as they 
have done fi-om the beginning, and thus the schizophrenic balance of love 
and fury will be maintained. It is in this murky atmosphere that tort law 
best serves to penalize and ameliorate the faults of people, and, if No- 
Fault can lessen tort law's labors and increase the bounties, No-Fault will 
find a home in torts. In support of this distant perspective, I offer my 
further remarks. 
A Little History 
For more than four centuries tort law was developed on the premise 
that one must so conduct himself as not to injure another, but if he did 
injure another he must compensate him.2 When industrial enterprise 
became a dominant social factor in the early 1800s, that premise was 
modified to enable enterprise to base its liability on a duty of care com- 
mensurate with the risk of injury. By the use of this social "gyroscope" 
the courts have developed modern tort actions appropriate to the risks of 
physical injury to which anyone at any moment may become a victim - 
'59 VA. L. REV. 749 (1973); see also O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds 
of Accidents: A Proposal and an "Economic" Analysis, 42 TENN. L. REV. 145 (1974). 
2Green & Smith, h'egligence Law, No-Fault, and Jury Trial-I ,  50 TEXAS L. REV. 1093, 
1096 (1972) [hereinafter cited as No-Fault and Jury Trial - IJ ; Green, The Thrust of Tort 
Law, Part I: The Influence of Environment, 64 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1961), in L. GREEN, THE 
LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW 59 (1965); Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its 
History (pts. 1-3), 7 HARV. L. REV. 315,383,441 (1894). 
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actions of trespass, nuisance, negligence, defective products, and ultra- 
hazardous enterprise. The big change in tort law came in the develop- 
ment of the negligence action based on the fault of the victim, with many 
defenses directed at the victim's conduct, and with all of the burdens 
shifted to him instead of remaining on the defendant as under the early 
common law actions which were based on the fault of the defendant.3 
The faults of victims and the defenses against liability were exploited 
throughout the 1 800s with practical immunity of enterprise for personal 
injuries4 until the casualties inflicted upon railroad and other industrial 
employees, passengers, and highway travelers received legislative atten- 
tion. Legislatures enacted wrongful death statutes, limited No-Fault 
workmen's compensation and employer liability systems which, after 
considerable opposition, gained the approval of the appellate courts! As 
a resu l~  in negligence actions for personal injury and death, whether 
based on common law or statute, the color of fault as a basis of liability or 
defense has over the years faded considerably into the duty of care com- 
mensurate with the risk of i n j ~ r y . ~  
Beginning late in the 1800s and accelerating throughout the 1900s, 
one of the chief functions of state and federal courts in personal injury 
litigation has been the rejection or modification of the common law de- 
fenses developed during the 1 These defenses could not withstand 
the changes in the social and economic environments largely created by 
enterprise itself. Its immunities were well entrenched and desperately 
defended, and there are still strongholds to be reduced and much doc- 
trinal debris to be removed. Legislatures have given aid by many specific 
statutes and especially by consenting to the rulemaking power of the 
courts under which many procedures have enabled the lawyers of the 
victims of enterprise to become an effective and respected professional 
group. 
But it must be added that the development of law schools; the publica- 
tion of law reviews and professional journals generally; a multitude of 
able young lawyers who have become practitioners, judges, teachers, and 
law clerks; numerous continuing legal education institutes; and socially 
motivated bar and other associations, have created a great profession es- 
sential to the operations of enterprise of every character and to the en- 
lightenment of the courts in the protection of its victims. 
3No-Fault and Jury Trial- I 1096-98; L. GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND IN- 
SURANCE 1 1-12 (1958). 
4No-Fault and Jury Trial - I 1098-99. 
5Id. at 1099; Green, The Texas Death Act, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 461 (1948); Malone, American 
Fatal Accidents Statutes -Part I: The Legislative Birth Pains, 1965 DUKE L.J. 673; Malone, 
The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043 (1965). 
"0 -hu l t  and Jury Trial - I 1099-1100. 
7Green & Smith, Negligence Law, No-Fault, and Jury Trial - 11, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 1297, 
1298 (1 972). 
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The Courthouse and the Courts 
The county courthouse has been the citizen's school of democratic 
government from the beginning - a symbol of justice both trusted and 
feared. It is the lawyer's forum, and even those who never enter there do 
their work in its shadow. Here people stand more equal and those who 
have sinned and those sinned against may fight out their differences un- 
der law, and, win or lose, live to sin and fight again another day. In the 
meanwhile, the courts have become the basic Anglo-American institu- 
tion for protecting against many types of injuries including the failure of 
enterprise to exercise care for its victims commensurate with the dangers 
of its activities. Any person, however insignificant, may bring any other 
person, however powerful into court to give account for serious injury 
that has been suffered at his hands. This is the most valuable right any 
person has for the protection of all his other rights, and this protection is 
enjoyed by enterprise and also by its victims. The tort action is the 
ombudsman for both. 
The courts are administered through judges, jurors, witnesses, and 
lawyers. They teach multitudes the disciplines of government they can 
learn nowhere else. They perform their services in the open for all to 
see, and their weakness is at times glaring and disturbing. But the court- 
rooms have been kept open-to people who have suffered injury at the 
hands of others, and it is the lawyer's obligation to see that they are never 
closed. The courthouse lawyers of both enterprise and its victims are en- 
trusted with great power and corresponding obligations. As officers of 
the courts they are essential to the administration of the law and to the 
protection of the rights of their clients under the law. They perform 
their functions always under the eyes of each other, the judges, the jurors, 
their clients, citizens at large, and are subject to discipline by their pro- 
fession under the supervision of the courts. No other professional group 
could survive such surveillance. They are under the severest discipline 
of any officials who render the services of government or of other institu- 
tions. And it is the Warrens, the Jaworskis and the Siricas who cleanse 
our temples and restore the faith of citizens in their law. 
The gloomy arguments made by the advocates of No-Fault based on 
the delays, expense, and uncertainties of litigation; the inability to make 
proof against manufacturers, con tractors, doctors, hospitals, and in- 
surance companies; and the high fees exacted by lawyers for the cumber- 
some processes and inadequate judgments gained for their clients are 
supposed to be arguments that require the removal of the protection 
given by the courts. They are equally arguments that heap shame upon 
enterprise for the callous neglect of its victims and make imperative the 
more adequate administration of the courts. The courts can yield to no 
substitute at the ground level of citizenship for sustaining a stable and 
effective government. And it may be said in their behalf that they would 
have made the adjustments between enterprise and its victims more 
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rational long ago if enterprise had not interposed its stubborn and selfish 
resistance. There are other and better ways for eliminating the weak- 
nesses of the courts than by reducing their responsibility and the protec- 
tion they give. 
If we as teachers of law acknowledge our own responsibility, the courts 
have a commitment of our fidelity. We teach their judges and those who 
appear before them in behalf of clients. We interpret their judgments 
and write the books they use, and are free to tell them when they err and 
to applaud when they score. We could not ask for more honorable service 
or have a more exacting obligation than to devote our energies to their 
successful administration. When they fail we also fail. 
The Problem 
The tort problems that come before the courts are not trifling. A 
serious personal injury is frequently the most severe tragedy a member of 
a family and the family itself can suffer. By statute the death action is a 
family action. The serious personal injury is even more a family action 
and has been so recognized by many judges and juries. The children and 
the disabled members of the family would not be in the courtroom dur- 
ing a personal injury trial were it not to demonstrate the obligations of 
the victim. They are not recorded as witnesses, and appellate courts, not 
knowing the weight they register with judge and jury, not infrequently 
reduce a victim's judgment. It is not too late to permit the full disclosure 
of the tragedies on which the courts pass judgment. 
Nor is it too late to ask enterprise to modify its attitude toward its vic- 
tims. With few exceptions, it has never recognized the full partnership it 
has with its employees, nor has it accepted its responsibility to its victims 
although it knows victims are inevitable in its operations. For a full cen- 
tury enterprise was given almost complete immunity from liability to its 
 victim^.^ It had to be forced to protect its employees from the dangers of 
the crude machines and tools of infant industry - forced even to provide 
a safe place for employees to work. When enterprise became able to pay 
its way, it had been spoiled by irresponsibility and had to be forced to con- 
tribute to the welfare of its injured workers by an insurance device which 
was seldom adjusted to the economic environment in which the em- 
ployees lived.9 The early shortsightedness of enterprise continues to 
bring periodic power struggles with its employees that hurt numberless 
innocent people. 
Enterprise is retarded in its social outlook. It goes to great expense to 
defeat the claims of consumers of its defectively dangerous products.lO I t  
still resents the use made of the courts by its victims and the contingent 
8No-Fault and Jury Trial - I 1097-99. 
s R ~ ~ O ~ ~  OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION  STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS (1972). 
lOMarschal1, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make A Right: Manufacturers' Liability for 
84 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1975: 
fees it pays their lawyers if successful in litigating their claims, though in 
the price its consumers pay for their goods and services they also pay for 
the defenses and the judgments against enterprise and the fees of its 
lawyers. 
Doctors are not different. They may even refuse to give evidence as 
experts in cases in which other doctors are sought to be held for mal- 
practice." There is no other instance of pure greed so heartless as the ap- 
propriation by the doctors and drug suppliers of the benefits of medicare 
and medicaid to the point of threatening their solvency.1z Nor are the 
claim agents of insurance and other industries always found trustworthy. 
They have been known to bring pressures to delay and reduce settle- 
ments, harass victims, and to employ deceits to deprive them of just settle- 
ments. Even the self-insured industries that anticipate the necessity of 
paying claims by budgeting them as a cost of doing business are inclined 
to resist their payment with all the savagery of the insurance companies. 
The victim's lawyer, who usually comes late into a case, is at great dis- 
advantage when the claim agents of enterprise have investigated, made 
lists, and obtained statements of witnesses instantly or within hours after 
the victim has been injured. If the claim is successfully or unsuccessfully 
litigated, the lawyer is frequently called a shyster or ambulance chaser 
though the investigation is made by a professional investigator. Even if 
we assume that many of the complaints made against the courts, lawyers, 
and tort action are true, most of them can be laid at the door of enterprise. 
Its attitude has been progressively self-defeating. The courts have found 
it necessary again and again to develop rules and procedures that enable 
victims to litigate their claims on a more equal basis.l3 Advocates who 
seek to have enterprise freed by No-Fault from the only power its victims 
have to protect themselves would in large part shift the responsibilities to 
the insurance industry that makes its profits from high premiums and 
low settlements of strictly worded policies that leave a policyholder de- 
fenseless against its contentions. And if the policy is not sufficient to 
meet the victim's losses, he is left to the resources provided for other emer- 
gencies. 
No-Fault Insurance 
The freedom from litigation sought for enterprise sails under a banner 
that may imply something for nothing. Its wide legislative acceptance for 
Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1065 (1973). 
"Brown v. Keaveny, 326 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright, J., dissenting); Kelner, T h e  
Silent Doctors - The Conspiracy of Silence, 5 U .  RICH. L. REV. 119 (1970). 
12Chase, Doctor's Bonanza: Znj7ational.y EfSects of Medicare and Medicaid, 156 NEW 
REPUBLIC 15 (Apr. 15, 1967); DeWolf, Medicare: T h e  Easy Swindle, 215 NATIOS 429 (1952). 
l3See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 7 (simplified pleadings), 15 (amended pleadings to conform to the 
evidence), 26-35 (extensive discovery), 54 (grant appropriate relief regardless of pleadings). 
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traffic injuries is limited to small claims.'* Such an arrangement would 
seem to be highly desirable over the whole area of small claims. A whole- 
sale method of dealing with mass problems that can be reduced to a sta- 
tistical basis without injustice to the extremes is sensible. The big prob- 
lem here is how much is small and how much is serious. The answer has 
apparently been found in a rather wide segment of claims left to the op- 
tion of the victims. The heavy advocacy on so many fronts merely to gain 
the acceptance of No-Fault for small claims would be worthwhile but 
would seem to be an oversell unless something more is in view. The 
possibility that the small claims approach is the beginning of a campaign 
to bring serious injuries under No-Fault is enough to require that all No- 
Fault settlements be made of record open to public verification. 
For serious injuries enterprise should never be permitted to be relieved 
of its obligation to care for its victims, even by shifting the responsibility 
to insurance. If deterrence has any social value, it must be sharply fo- 
cused on this obligation case by case. If the economic burden borne by 
enterprise or its consumers is an important factor in caring for the in- 
jured and their families, the fact should be kept out in the open. Neither 
enterprise nor its consumers would have just cause for complaint. The  
care of victims is as much the cost of doing business as are the raw ma- 
terials required for products and services. The pinch that would count 
can only be found in the day-to-day transactions, not in the broad con- 
cepts of the economic theorists. 
I would not argue that a legislature may not strip citizens of their 
rights. I simply move to the higher ground that no other victim is re- 
quired to surrender a comparable right and that such a deprivation 
would do great injustice and would take from the courts a power essential 
to a free society and leave those who should share the responsibility be- 
yond the reach of both the victim and the courts. The tort way of justice 
is the examination of every case of serious injuries on its merits. The 
variations in serious injuries to victims under widely different circum- 
stances are too diverse in the injuries and the victim's needs to submit to 
a statistical basis when we have well-established institutions for dealing 
with victims and those by whose operations they are injured on the basis 
of their conduct, responsibilities, burdens, and resources. It will be far 
easier and less expensive to prepare judges and lawyers to function re- 
sponsibly to the ends desired than to develop other institutions to serve 
those ends. 
It may be that beneath the hopes of those who place their faith in No- 
Fault insurance is a belief that the courts are not employing reliable, just, 
and consistent methods in evaluating the injuries suffered by the victims. 
Such belief would have a substantial basis for legitimate criticism of tort 
l4Keeton, Compensation Systems and Utah's No-Fault Statute, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 383, 
385-90. 
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law and the courts, and would warrant great efforts to influence the 
courts and the legal profession to readjust their procedures to meet the 
criticisms lodged against them. It is on that hypothesis that I suggest that 
enterprise is able to pay its way, and should be required to provide care 
for its victims, and that the courts have the power and the responsibility 
to provide procedures for the judges themselves to evaluate the injuries 
inflicted by enterprise as determined by jury trial with full justice both 
to the victim and enterprise.l5 And as an incident of the exercise of this 
function of evaluation, the judges must also monitor the fees to which 
the lawyers of the victims are entitled.l6 
Assessment of Damages 
The assessment of damages in serious personal injury and death cases 
is frequently the most difficult issue in a tort action.'? In most cases it is 
beyond the competence of a jury of laymen. Although the courts have 
the power to control the issue, together with the rule-making power to 
initiate procedures, they have done little to meet the 20thcentury magni- 
tude of the assessment problem. For the most part they still rely on a 
poorly designed veto power if a verdict seems to be too big or too 1ittle.ls 
The assessment of damages on the basis of compensation for the in- 
juries suffered is rarely possible in serious personal injury cases and also in 
death cases. The basic considerations in behalf of a seriously injured 
victim should be his rehabilitation or his care in light of his physical in- 
juries and his economic obligations. The economic considerations of the 
defendant enterprise in many cases will be of equal importance. The 
verdicts of juries are little more than wild guesses. Only the judges are 
capable of making the studies and gaining the experience necessary to 
determine awards to meet the ends of justice to victims and to enter- 
prise.lg 
Trial by judge and jury, or by trial judge alone, should determine the 
issues of liability, the items of injury, and the comparative fault per- 
centages of the conduct of the litigants. Then the trial judge alone should 
continue the trial in the exploratory process for assessment of the dam- 
ages based on the liability findings. The items of physical injury and 
expenses, together with the needs of the future, will frequently require 
the use of experts. The economic considerations are not those of eco- 
l5Green k Smith, Negligence Law, No-Fault, and Ju ly  Trial (pts. 1-4), 50 TEXAS L. REV. 
1093,1297 (1972), 51 TEXAS L. REV. 207,825 (1973). 
16Green 8r Smith, Negligence Law, No-Fault, and Jury Trial-IV,  51 TEXAS L. REV. 
825, 841-42 (1973). 
' 'Id. at 828-29; Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injuiy: T h e  Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW k 
Corur~aip. PROB. 219,221-22 (1953). 
'SGreen & Smith, hregligence Law, hTo-Fault, and Jury Trial - IV,  51 TEXAS L. REV. 825, 
829 (1973). 
l9Id. at 842-45. 
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nomic theory of commerce and trade, but the specific economic problems 
of the litigants - applied economics based on ascertainable factual data. 
The judges have no other function of greater importance. The insurance 
companies cannot provide adequate and consistent protection at reason- 
able costs until the courts provide a reliable basis for evaluating the losses. 
As difficult as the problem may seem, it will yield to study and ex- 
perien~e.~O 
20A more comprehensive discussion of this proposal is presented in Green 8: Smith, Negli- 
gence Law, No-Fault, and Jury Trial - ZV, 51 TEXAS L. k v .  825 (1973). 
